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RETRANSMISSION SERVICES 
Jake Makar 
As Internet technology has advanced, consumers have 
increasingly opted to view video content on their computer, 
tablet, and smartphone screens instead of their television 
screens. In American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (“Aereo 
III”), decided in 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected one of 
the more creative methods of delivering content via the 
Internet, closing a legal loophole by ruling that a company 
could not escape copyright liability by characterizing its 
retransmission of content as simply providing the consumer 
with equipment. Although the ruling definitively answered 
one question that had been subject to debate, the battle over 
Internet broadcasting has simply moved to another arena. 
The decision has led Aereo and similar companies to argue 
that they should be allowed to take advantage of the 
compulsory licensing scheme available to “cable systems” 
under Section 111 of the Copyright Act. The result of this new 
debate could have far-reaching effects on how consumers can 
access television content and on how the courts will interpret 
the Copyright Act in the future. 
This Note examines the decisions made in the wake of 
Aereo III that have addressed the application of Section 111 
and, in particular, contrasts the reasoning of Fox v. 
Aereokiller, in which the U.S. District Court for the Central 
District of California held that Internet rebroadcasting 
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services are eligible for a compulsory license under Section 
111, with the reasoning of courts that have come to the 
opposite conclusion. This Note argues that both the text of 
Section 111 and its legislative history demonstrate that 
Internet rebroadcasting services fall under the statutory 
definition of “cable system.” It further argues that granting 
access to the compulsory licensing scheme would accomplish 
the important policy goal of increasing competition in the 
marketplace. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The market for video content is shifting toward the 
Internet, and everybody knows it. Increasingly, individuals 
are consuming movies and television programs online 
through sites such as Netflix and YouTube.1 The demand for 
traditional cable television has slowed as more consumers 
opt to cancel their cable subscriptions and rely solely on the 
Internet to provide video content.2 In the face of such rapid 
change, a number of companies have emerged that have 
attempted to take advantage of this new method of content 
delivery by rebroadcasting television programming directly 
to consumers via the Internet. Predictably, this behavior has 
resulted in litigation that has tasked courts with applying 
the Copyright Act to this technological innovation. 
In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an Internet 
video streaming company, Aereo, was publicly performing 
copyrighted works under the meaning of the Copyright Act.3 
Although the ruling definitively answered a question that 
had been subject to debate, it left others undecided and, 
according to some commentators, needlessly created 
substantial uncertainty within copyright law.4 Notably, the 
Court did not consider whether Aereo should be allowed to 
take advantage of the compulsory licensing scheme available 
 
1 See, e.g., Christopher Williams, Traditional TV Viewing is Over: 
YouTube Habit is Permanent, Warn Researchers, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 12, 
2016, 3:23 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/media 
technologyandtelecoms/media/12067340/Traditional-TV-viewing-is-over-
YouTube-habit-is-permanent-warn-researchers.html. 
2 Todd Spangler, Cord-Cutting Alert: Pay-TV Business Declines for 
First Time During Q1, VARIETY (May 11, 2015, 10:46 AM), http:// 
variety.com/2015/biz/news/cord-cutting-alert-pay-tv-business-declines-for-
first-time-in-q1-1201492308/ [https://perma.cc/9JJ3-C2MW]. 
3 Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo III), 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 
(2014). 
4 See Mitch Stoltz, Symposium: Aereo Decision Injects Uncertainty 
into Copyright, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2014, 2:18 PM), http://www.scotus 
blog.com/2014/06/symposium-aereo-decision-injects-uncertainty-into-copy 
right/ [https://perma.cc/277Z-D9TM]. 
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through Section 111 of the Copyright Act.5 This decision has 
led Aereo and similar companies to argue that they should 
be entitled to these compulsory licenses. In large part, the 
issue revolves around whether Internet retransmission 
services fall under the Copyright Act’s definition of “cable 
systems,” and different courts have come to different 
conclusions depending on the interpretive methods used. The 
result of this debate could have far-reaching effects on how 
consumers can access television content and on how the 
courts will interpret the Copyright Act in the future. 
This Note seeks to resolve this difficulty left unaddressed 
by the Supreme Court and argues that Internet streaming 
services should be eligible for the Section 111 license. Part II 
provides background necessary to conduct the analysis, 
including the history of the Copyright Act and a discussion of 
case law relevant to the issue of cable television. Part III 
analyzes the differences in reasoning motivating the 
dissimilar results of the Ninth Circuit as compared to the 
D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit. Part IV argues that the 
Ninth Circuit’s position is more persuasive and that Section 
111 licenses should be available to Internet retransmission 
services. Finally, Part V briefly concludes. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In order to properly frame the issue, this Part provides 
the relevant historical and legal context that bears on 
whether and how Internet television streaming services 
should fit within the compulsory licensing scheme of Section 
111. 
 
5 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012). 
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A. Brief History of Copyright and Compulsory 
Licensing 
Congressional authority to protect intellectual property is 
derived from the Copyright Clause of the Constitution,6 and 
the Copyright Act of 1976 provides the current statutory 
framework governing American copyright law.7 The 
underlying purpose of copyright protection is to provide a 
mechanism to incentivize creators to produce works that the 
public can enjoy.8 Thus, copyright is an attempt to promote 
the public good by granting a private property right. Courts 
have recognized that copyright therefore demands the 
balancing of private interests and public interests.9 
The first Copyright Act, enacted in 1790, was rather 
limited in terms of the types of works that were 
copyrightable and how long the Act offered protection. 
Subsequent revisions of the Act gradually expanded 
copyright law to recognize new categories of works in 
response to technological changes.10 One particularly 
significant step was the introduction of a public performance 
right, included in the 1856 amendment to the 1790 
 
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries”). 
7 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)).  
8 See JANE C. GINSBURG & ROBERT A. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW 1 
(2012) (“The basic purpose of U.S. copyright is to enrich our society’s 
wealth of culture and information. The means for doing so is to grant 
exclusive rights in the exploitation and marketing of a work as an 
incentive to those who create it.”); Samuel J. Dykstra, Note, Weighing 
Down the Cloud: The Public Performance Right and the Internet After 
Aereo, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 989, 996 (2015). 
9 See GILLIAN DAVIES, COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST § 5-022, at 
99 (2d ed. 2002); Dykstra, supra note 8, at 996. 
10 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:20 (2016) [hereinafter 
1 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT] (stating how amendments following the 1790 Act 
recognized new rights, matters, and remedies); Dykstra, supra note 8, at 
996–97.  
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Copyright Act.11 The recognition of such a right has had a 
significant effect on the cable television business that 
continues to this day. 
By 1909, copyright law had become both complicated and 
opaque, and Congress responded to calls for broad reform by 
passing the Copyright Act of 1909.12 The 1909 Act introduced 
the first compulsory licensing scheme in U.S. copyright 
law.13 Compulsory licensing, which initially applied to the 
music industry, arose in a context that is also instructive to 
an analysis of its application to cable television. The Aeolian 
Company, a producer of piano rolls, inspired congressional 
concern by attempting to secure exclusive rights from 
various music publishers to produce the perforated music 
sheets used in the company’s automatic musical machines.14 
If it had reached enough of these agreements, the company 
would have been able to corner the music market and drive 
smaller firms out of business. As a result, any public 
performance of these compositions would have required the 
purchase of the Aeolian-produced piano roll and the Aeolian-
produced musical machine. Fearful of this monopoly power, 
Congress created a compulsory licensing scheme under 
which, if a copyright owner agreed to allow a third party to 
produce the work mechanically, “any other person may make 
similar use of the copyrighted work upon the payment to the 
copyright proprietor of a royalty of two cents on each such 
part manufactured.”15 Thus, a compulsory license operates as 
an exception to “the privilege of determining who reaps the 
profits of [one’s property] and what those profits will be,” a 
 
11 Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138. 
12 See generally 1 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, at § 1:45 
(discussing the historical background of 1909 Copyright Act). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076; see 
also 1 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, at § 1:45 (discussing how the 
compulsory licensing provisions of the 1909 Act were in part a response to, 
and indirectly overturned, White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 
U.S. 1 (1908), which held that piano rolls were not copies within the 
meaning of the Copyright Act). 
MAKAR – FINAL 
No. 2:475] AFTER AEREO 481 
 
characteristic that is “[i]mplicit in the ownership of 
property.”16 This history would provide a strong basis for the 
later application to cable television given the substantially 
similar problems of competition and access. 
B. The Copyright Act of 1976 and the Rise of Cable 
Television 
Despite “some notable improvements” to copyright law, 
the 1909 Act contained “a good deal of incoherence, 
inconsistency and opaqueness in certain sections,” as it was 
“ultimately a composite of several tentative bills and 
proposals embodying different points of view.”17 As a result, 
“pressure mounted for the comprehensive revision and 
modernization of the Copyright Act” around 1950.18 Not the 
least of concerns was the rapid advancement of technology, 
with the development of the motion picture, the phonograph, 
radio, and television marking the intervening years.19 The 
Copyright Act of 1976, an omnibus revision, sought to 
comprehensively reform American copyright law and account 
for some of these new technologies.20 Cable television 
represented an industry that Congress was particularly 
interested in sorting out following a pair of controversial 
Supreme Court decisions, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists 
Television, Inc. and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia 
Broadcasting Systems, Inc.21 Fortnightly involved 
 
16 WILLIAM S. STRONG, THE COPYRIGHT BOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 211 
(6th ed. 2014). 
17 ROBERT A. GORMAN, JANE C. GINSBURG & R. ANTHONY REESE, 
COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 7 (8th ed. 2011). 
18 Id.; see also 1 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, at § 1:72 (noting 
that “[f]ollowing [U.S.] adherence to the [Universal Copyright Convention 
in 1955] . . . it became apparent that an intensive reexamination of the 
1909 Act was long overdue.”). 
19 GORMAN, GINSBURG & REESE, supra note 17, at 7. 
20 See id.; 1 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, at § 1:1. 
21 Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 
(1968); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 
(1974); see also 1 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, at § 1:80 (describing 
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Community Antenna Television (“CATV”) systems, which 
“consist[ed] of antennas [sic] . . . with connecting coaxial 
cables, strung on utility poles, to carry the signals received 
by the antennas to the home television sets of individual 
subscribers.”22 Applying reasoning that was somewhat 
distinct from that of previous decisions involving radio,23 the 
Court held that CATV simply enhances a viewer’s capacity to 
receive signals, and therefore does not “perform” the 
copyrighted works, noting that such systems “did not 
‘perform’ the respondent’s copyrighted works in any 
conventional sense of that term, or in any manner envisaged 
by the Congress that enacted the law in 1909.”24 The 
relevant analysis, according to the majority, was whether the 
service in question acted as a broadcaster or as a viewer.25 
Under this framework, the Court concluded that CATV “falls 
on the viewer’s side of the line.”26 The Court extended this 
logic even further in Teleprompter, holding that even where 
a CATV system “imports” signals that would not otherwise 
be viewable in the market, it does not “perform” under the 
1909 Act.27 
 
the effects of the two decisions and noting that “the Teleprompter decision 
spurred on rather than stalled the revision effort”). 
22 Fortnightly Corp. 392 U.S. at 392. 
23 Compare Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. 400–01 (holding that a CATV 
system was not publicly performing), with Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty 
Co., 283 U.S. 191, 201 (1931) (holding that a hotel transmitting a radio 
broadcast into each room was publicly performing); see also Fortnightly 
Corp., 392 U.S. at 406 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority 
decision is incompatible with the Court’s previous ruling in Buck); 
Dykstra, supra note 8, at 1001 (describing the Fortnightly decision as “a 
surprising departure from the Court’s earlier holding about radio 
retransmissions in Buck”). 
24 Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 395, 399. 
25 Id. at 398 (“Broadcasters perform. Viewers do not perform.”). 
26 Id. at 399. 
27 Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 
412 (1974).  
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Fortnightly and Teleprompter brought the significance of 
cable television to the forefront,28 and forced Congress to 
take revision efforts seriously. The resulting treatment of 
cable television in the Copyright Act of 1976 was notable in 
that it overturned the Fortnightly and Teleprompter 
decisions and instituted a compulsory licensing scheme 
similar to the one that had proven effective in the music 
context.29 The “Transmit Clause” of Section 101 of the 1976 
Act provides that transmissions similar to those at issue in 
Fortnightly and Teleprompter fall under the definition of 
public performance.30 As the Supreme Court stated in 
American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (“Aereo III”), “one 
of Congress’ primary purposes in amending the Copyright 
Act in 1976 was to overturn this Court’s determination that 
[CATV systems] fell outside the Act’s scope.”31 Section 111(c), 
implicitly reinforcing Section 101’s purpose to capture the 
 
28 See TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH 177 (2010) (describing cable 
television as a “disruptive innovation . . . and one that would shred the 
prevailing power structure of television”). 
29 GORMAN, GINSBURG & REESE, supra note 17, at 8 (calling the 
“[i]mpositon of copyright liability on cable television systems” and the 
attendant compulsory licensing provisions “key provisions of the 1976 
law”). 
30 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“To perform or display a work ‘publicly’ 
means (1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any 
place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a 
family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to transmit or 
otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place 
specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, 
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or 
display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same 
time or at different times.”); see also Sara K. Stadler, Performance Values, 
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 697, 723 (2008) (“Taking the side of the dissenters 
in Fortnightly and Aiken, Congress defined ‘performance’ broadly . . . .”). 
31 Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2504 (2014); see also H.R. REP. 94-1476, 
at 87 (1976) (discussing the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of 
“perform” in the 1909 Act which was “completely overturned by [the 1976 
Act] and its broad definition of ‘perform’ in section 101”). 
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activities of cable television systems,32 states in pertinent 
part: 
[S]econdary transmissions to the public by a cable 
system of a performance or display of a work 
embodied in a primary transmission . . . shall be 
subject to statutory licensing upon compliance with 
the requirements of subsection (d) where the carriage 
of the signals comprising the secondary transmission 
is permissible under the rules, regulations, or 
authorizations of the Federal Communications 
Commission.33 
Thus, these provisions effectively place the activity of 
cable television systems within the ambit of the 1976 Act.34 
However, broadcasters’ rights are subject to the limitation 
created by the enactment of Section 111, “authorizing the 
third party exploitation, but requiring payment as 
determined by an administrative rate-setting procedure.”35 
C. Aereo and Its “Public Performance” Defense 
As with previous iterations of American copyright law, as 
technology has continued to advance, the limitations of the 
Copyright Act—especially with regard to cable television 
provisions—have been exposed. One of the early signs of the 
ambiguities that the statutory language would hold was the 
arrival of “Remote Storage” Digital Video Recorder systems 
(“RS-DVR”), addressed in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC 
 
32 See Dykstra, supra note 8, at 1006 (describing Section 111 as 
“[f]urther evidence of Congress’s intent to protect broadcast television from 
the activities of cable television systems”); see also 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, 
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 14:60 (2016) [hereinafter 4 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT] 
(“The basic concept underpinning Section 111 is that contrary to the 
Supreme Court’s Fortnightly and Teleprompter decisions, cable 
operators . . . are engaging in a performance.”). 
33 17 U.S.C. § 111(c) (2012). 
34 4 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 32, at § 14:73. 
35 GORMAN, GINSBURG & REESE, supra note 17, at 798. 
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Holdings, Inc. (“Cablevision”).36 RS-DVRs are systems that 
are similar to standalone DVRs in that they are used to 
digitally record television broadcasts. However, there is one 
important difference that rendered RS-DVRs a much more 
difficult problem: the RS-DVR allows customers to store 
recorded programming on central hard drives at a “remote” 
location.37 Customers were then able to “receive playback of 
those programs through their home television sets, using 
only a remote control and a standard cable box equipped 
with the RS-DVR software.”38 In Cablevision, the 
broadcasters alleged that this activity directly infringed on 
their copyrights by engaging in public performances of their 
protected works.39 Concluding that “the transmit clause 
directs us to examine who precisely is ‘capable of receiving’ a 
particular transmission of a performance,”40 the Court held 
that “[b]ecause each RS–DVR playback transmission is made 
to a single subscriber using a single unique copy produced by 
that subscriber . . . such transmissions are not performances 
‘to the public,’ and therefore do not infringe any exclusive 
right of public performance.”41 As the Internet grew more 
ubiquitous, certain companies—notably, Aereo—attempted 
 
36 Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
37 Id. at 124. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 123. Plaintiffs also argued that their copyrights were 
infringed by the initial act of copying the work. Id. at 124–26. However, 
the court determined that the copies were made by individuals, rather 
than the cable company. Id. at 133. 
40 Id. at 135. 
41 Id. at 139; see also WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 
F.3d 676, 689 (2d Cir. 2013) rev’d sub nom. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. 
(Aereo III), 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (discussing the Cablevision court’s 
interpretation of the Transmit Clause); 4 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 
32, at § 14:28 (discussing the interpretation of the 1976 Act’s public 
performance right). 
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to take advantage of the Cablevision court’s interpretation of 
the Transmit Clause.42 
Recognizing an opportunity in the Cablevision court’s 
interpretation of the ambiguous language of the Transmit 
Clause, Aereo organized its business specifically to avoid 
paying for any licenses. Central to Aereo’s system was a 
warehouse that stored thousands of small antennae, each 
capable of receiving over-the-air television broadcast 
signals.43 Upon a user’s selection of a program on the 
company’s website, Aereo’s servers selected one of the 
antennae, dedicated it to that user, and tuned in to the 
signal carrying the program.44 Importantly, only a single 
subscriber could use any one antenna at any given time.45 
The system then saved a copy of the program as a separate 
file for each user and transmitted that file to the user over 
the Internet.46 Aereo argued that the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the Transmit 
Clause in Cablevision was correct and that, under that 
interpretation, Aereo’s transmissions were not “public 
performances” under Section 101.47 The Second Circuit, 
applying Cablevision, had held that Aereo’s transmissions 
were not public performances under Section 101.48 The 
Supreme Court disagreed.49 The majority opinion noted that 
the history surrounding the Copyright Act of 1976 evinces 
the congressional intent to overturn the Court’s rulings in 
 
42 See Dykstra, supra note 8, at 1007 (describing RS-DVR as “A 
Prelude to Aereo”). 




47 Brief for Respondent at 17, Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 
13–461) (arguing that “the Second Circuit correctly interpreted the 
Transmit Clause” and because “Aereo’s equipment facilitates only ‘one-to-
one’ transmissions . . . [t]hose transmissions do not constitute ‘public’ 
performances”). 
48 Aereo II, 712 F.3d 676, 695 (2d Cir. 2013).  
49 Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2503.  
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Fortnightly and Teleprompter.50 Comparing the activities of 
Aereo to those of the CATV systems targeted by the 1976 
Act, the Court held that Aereo’s service was a public 
performance under Section 101.51 However, the Court was 
careful to limit its Aereo III opinion to the facts at bar and 
explicitly declined to set forth a generally applicable rule.52 
As a result, it left as an open question whether its “looks-
like-cable” reasoning would have the same force in the 
Section 111 context and necessitate allowing Internet 
streaming services to take advantage of that section’s 
compulsory licensing scheme. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. A Brief Summary of the Deference Standards 
The primary focus of this Note is Section 111 itself—the 
text and legislative history. However, because “the Copyright 
Office—the federal agency charged with overseeing [Section] 
111—has spoken on the issue of whether [Section] 111’s 
compulsory licenses extend to Internet retransmissions,” it is 
clear that any court considering this question must consider 
the level of deference that should be accorded to the 
Copyright Office’s position.53 As a result, this Part will 
provide a summary of the two possible standards of 
deference a court may apply—Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
 
50 Id. at 2504–06. 
51 Id. at 2506 (“Aereo’s activities are substantially similar to those of 
the CATV companies that Congress amended the Act to reach.”); see also 
id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s conclusion that Aereo 
performs boils down to the following syllogism: (1) Congress amended the 
Act to overrule our decisions holding that cable systems do not perform 
when they retransmit over-the-air broadcasts; (2) Aereo looks a lot like a 
cable system; therefore (3) Aereo performs.”). 
52 Id. at 2511 (“We cannot now answer more precisely how the 
Transmit Clause or other provisions of the Copyright Act will apply to 
technologies not before us.”); see also 4 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 32, 
at § 14:28. 
53 WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 279 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. or Skidmore v. Swift 
& Co.—and briefly analyze the arguments on either side. 
Under Chevron, courts must conduct a two-part analysis 
whenever confronted with an administrative agency’s 
construction of a statute: 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the 
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress. If, however, . . . the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer 
is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.54 
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court clarified the 
Chevron standard, holding, “[i]nterpretations such as those 
in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy 
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all 
of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style 
deference.”55 In these cases, courts should instead apply the 
lower deference standard articulated in Skidmore v. Swift & 
Co., under which the weight a court should give to an 
administrative agency’s judgment “will depend upon the 
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.”56 In order to 
determine which of these two standards is appropriate in a 
given case, the court must apply a two-step inquiry, first 
asking whether “Congress delegated authority to the agency 
generally to make rules carrying the force of law” and second 
 
54 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842–43 (1984). 
55 Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). 
56 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
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asking whether “the agency interpretation . . . was 
promulgated in exercise of that authority.”57 
The cases that have addressed the application of Section 
111 to Internet retransmission services reveal disagreement 
with respect to the appropriate standard of deference.58 The 
lack of a “formal regulation governing internet-based 
retransmission services” raises doubts about the validity of 
the argument that Chevron deference should apply.59 As the 
FilmOn court mentions, although the plaintiffs can point to 
some formal regulations that “establish that [Section] 111 is 
‘clearly directed at localized transmission services,’” those 
regulations “only considered the eligibility of satellite 
carriers, multipoint distribution service, and multichannel 
multipoint distribution service to operate under the § 111 
compulsory license. Therefore, the regulations did not 
specifically address the question of whether an Internet-
based retransmission service qualifies as a cable system.”60 
Because the Copyright Office’s position “is not based on a 
formal regulation but on a series of statements, policy 
documents, and congressional testimonies over the years,”61 
it seems clear that these cases demand Skidmore deference 
rather than Chevron. Although the exact contours of 
 
57 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). 
58 Compare ivi, 691 F.3d at 284 (citing Mead in deferring to the 
Copyright Office’s position under Chevron), with Fox Television Stations, 
Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, No. 13-758 (RMC), 2015 WL 7761052, at *17, *19 
(D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2015) (deferring to the Copyright Office’s position under 
Skidmore, after noting that the ivi court “did not discuss why it found the 
Copyright Office's interpretation entitled to Chevron deference as opposed 
to a lesser type of deference”), and Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. 
AereoKiller LLC, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1168–69 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (deeming 
the ivi decision “not persuasive” while declining to defer to the Copyright 
Office’s position under Chevron). The broadcasting companies continue to 
argue that Chevron deference should apply. See generally Brief of 
Appellants at 45–60, Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. AereoKiller LLC, No. 
15-56420 (9th Cir. Jan. 27, 2016). 
59 FilmOn, 2015 WL 7761052, at *17. 
60 Id. at *17 n.19. 
61 Id. at *18. 
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Skidmore are somewhat unclear, “[i]t is easy enough to 
recognize the consensus view that Skidmore gives judges 
more discretion than Chevron’s command of mandatory 
deference.”62 As Part IV argues, the plain meaning of Section 
111, the legislative history surrounding the statute, and 
policies underlying the compulsory licensing scheme do not 
comport with the Copyright Office’s position, and therefore 
that interpretation does not deserve deference under 
Skidmore. 
B. The Copyright Office Position Rejecting Internet-
Based Services’ Eligibility for a Section 111 License 
In the view of the Copyright Office, the Section 111 
compulsory license should not be extended to Internet 
retransmission services, both as a policy matter and as a 
matter of statutory interpretation.63 The Copyright Office 
has emphatically declared that the extension of the 
compulsory licensing scheme to Internet retransmission 
systems “is not warranted, and . . . not comparable to 
retransmissions via cable and satellite.”64 As noted in the 
AereoKiller decision, discussed in Part III.C infra, the 
Office’s “restrictive view concerning Section 111 [is] no 
surprise . . . . ‘The Copyright Office has long been a critic of 
 
62 Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the 
Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1250 (2007).  
63 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, A REVIEW OF THE COPYRIGHT LICENSING 
REGIMES COVERING RETRANSMISSION OF BROADCAST SIGNALS 91–99 (1997); 
Copyright Broadcast Programming on the Internet: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter Peters Statement] (statement of 
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights), http://copyright.gov/docs/reg 
stat61500.html [https://perma.cc/8R7L-KQV3]; see also Letter from 
Jacqueline C. Charlesworth, General Counsel and Associate Register of 
Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office, to Matthew Calabro, Director of 
Financial Planning & Analysis and Revenue, Aereo, Inc. (July 16, 2014) 
[hereinafter Charlesworth Letter]. 
64 Peters Statement, supra note 63. 
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compulsory licensing for broadcast retransmissions.’”65 
Indeed, the Copyright Office was arguing for the elimination 
of the compulsory cable license as early as 1981.66 
The Copyright Office has consistently taken the position 
that the language of Section 111 does not extend to Internet 
transmissions.67 As stated by the Register of Copyrights, “if 
there is to be a compulsory license covering such 
retransmissions, it will have to come from newly enacted 
legislation and not existing law.”68 The Copyright Office has 
stated that this conclusion remains unchanged in the wake 
of the Supreme Court’s Aereo III decision.69 This 
interpretation of the text is based on Section 111(f)’s 
references to “headends” and “contiguous communities,” 
which “proves that the compulsory license applies only to 
localized retransmission services regulated as cable systems 
by the [Federal Communication Commission (“FCC”)].”70 
Similarly, the Office has also pointed to the Section 111(c) 
requirement that the retransmission is “permissible under 
the rules, regulations, or authorizations of the Federal 
Communications Commission” as demonstrating a close link 
 
65 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. AereoKiller, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 
1164 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Peters Statement, supra note 63); see also 
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION AND 
REAUTHORIZATION ACT, SECTION 109 REPORT, at vi-vii (2008) [hereinafter 
SHVERA REPORT] (expressing the Copyright Office’s opinion that “[i]t is 
now time to phase out Section 111 and Section 119”); Annemarie Bridy, 
Aereo: From Working Around Copyright to Thinking Inside the (Cable) 
Box, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 465, 477 (2015) (“It is thus not surprising that 
the Office, whenever it has been called upon to do so, has construed the 
scope of § 111 in a vanishingly narrow way.”). 
66 Peters Statement, supra note 63; see also SHVERA REPORT, supra 
note 65, at 78. 
67 Peters Statement, supra note 63 (“[T]he section 111 license does not 
and should not apply to Internet transmissions.”) (quoting Letter from 
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to the Honorable Howard Coble 
(Nov. 10, 1999)). 
68 Peters Statement, supra note 63. 
69 Charlesworth Letter, supra note 63. 
70 Cable Compulsory License; Definition of Cable System, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 3284, 3290–92 (Jan. 29, 1992) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
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between FCC regulation and the availability of the Section 
111 compulsory license.71 The Copyright Office has 
interpreted these references to FCC regulation “to mean that 
the retransmitter must be affirmatively regulated by those 
rules.”72 As the Copyright Office has acknowledged, this 
second argument is explicitly dependent upon FCC 
regulation.73 As a result, its validity is complicated to some 
extent by the FCC’s consideration of a rule that would 
qualify Internet retransmission services as multichannel 
video programming distributors (“MVPDs”) under 
communications law.74 
From a policy perspective, the Copyright Office bases its 
position against making the Section 111 compulsory license 
available to Internet retransmission services on what it 
perceives as “a fundamental difference between Internet 
retransmissions and retransmissions via cable and 
satellite.”75 That is, “[b]oth cable and satellite provide a 
means of delivering broadcast signals that copyright owners 
cannot practicably do themselves.”76 Thus, in the Copyright 
Office’s view, because the copyright owners face no 
significant obstacles to making their content available over 
 
71 17 U.S.C. § 111(c) (2012); Cable Compulsory License; Definition of 
Cable System, 57 Fed. Reg. at 3292 (“[I]t is apparent that the operation of 
section 111 is hinged on the FCC rules regulating the cable industry.”). 
72 Bridy, supra note 65, at 475. But see WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 765 F. 
Supp. 2d 594, 616 n.33 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(“The Copyright Office’s tentative endorsement of the AT & T U–Verse 
system, which does not appear to be subject to the Communications Act, 
implies that the Office does not believe that in order to qualify as a cable 
system under Section 111, an entity must be governed by the FCC.”). 
73 See Charlesworth Letter, supra note 63.   
74 Promoting Innovation and Competition in the Provision of 
Multichannel Video Programming Distribution Services, 80 Fed. Reg. 
2078, 2080 (proposed Dec. 19, 2014) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76) 
(“tentatively” concluding “that the statutory definition of MVPD includes 
certain Internet-based distributors of video programming”); see also Fox 
Television Stations, Inc. v. AereoKiller, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1169–70 
(C.D. Cal. 2015). 
75 Peters Statement, supra note 63. 
76 Id. 
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the Internet, it would be inappropriate to implement a 
coercive compulsory license and Congress should instead 
allow the free market to work.77 In addition, the Copyright 
Office has argued that introducing copyrighted works to the 
Internet is a dangerous proposition given the ease with 
which bad actors could copy and reproduce that content.78 In 
light of the explosion of available online content today, the 
continued relevance of this second concern is somewhat 
dubious. 
C. The Copyright Office Prevails: WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, 
Inc., Aereo IV, and Fox v. FilmOn X 
In 2012, the Second Circuit considered WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, 
Inc., a case that presented the court with the issue of 
whether the cable system compulsory licensing scheme of 
Section 111 is available to an Internet streaming company.79 
A coalition of producers and owners of television 
programming brought a copyright infringement suit against 
ivi, an Internet-based company that was re-broadcasting 
television programming via Internet stream.80 The court, 
undertaking a Chevron analysis, determined that the 
compulsory licenses of Section 111 did not extend to Internet 
retransmission services.81 Although the statutory text was, 
in the opinion of the court, ambiguous, the legislative history 
clearly demonstrated that Congress did not intend to include 
 
77 SHVERA REPORT, supra note 65, at 188. 
78 Id. at 181 (citing “serious questions about signal security” as a 
reason for excluding Internet retransmissions from the scope of § 111); see 
also Peters Statement, supra note 63 (“[I]t is all too easy for recipients of 
such transmissions to find ways to circumvent those measures and 
download perfect digital copies, which then could be redisseminated 
without limit online. The resulting harm to copyright owners in a global 
market could be irreparable.”); Bridy, supra note 65, at 476 (“One impetus 
for the failed amendment was the Office’s perception—post-Napster—that 
the Internet is just not a safe place for copyrighted content.”). 
79 WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012). 
80 Id. at 277. 
81 Id. at 279–82. 
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Internet transmissions in the Section 111 compulsory 
licensing scheme.82 
The court first examined the language of Sections 
111(c)(1) and 111(f)(3).83 The heart of ivi’s challenge came 
down to whether it could be considered a “cable system” as 
defined in 111(f)(3). According to the court, this 
determination could not be made from the statutory text 
alone because its language is unclear as to “whether such a 
service (1) is or utilizes a ‘facility’ (2) that receives and 
retransmits signals (3) through wires, cables, microwave, or 
other communication channels.”84 Perhaps realizing that the 
second and third points seem to be rather easily met by ivi’s 
streaming service, the court chose to focus on the term 
“facility,” stating that it is unclear whether an Internet 
service can qualify as a “facility” under Section 111 because 
“the Internet . . . is neither a physical nor a tangible 
entity.”85 Additionally, the court implied that the lack of 
centralization of the Internet weighed against a finding that 
it could be considered a facility.86 Concluding its analysis, 
 
82 Id. 
83 See id. at 279–80. Section 111(c)(1) is reproduced and discussed 
supra in Part II.B and Section 111(f)(3) defines a “cable system” as: 
a facility, located in any State, territory, trust territory, or 
possession of the United States, that in whole or in part 
receives signals transmitted or programs broadcast by one 
or more television broadcast stations licensed by the 
Federal Communications Commission, and makes 
secondary transmissions of such signals or programs by 
wires, cables, microwave, or other communications 
channels to subscribing members of the public who pay for 
such service.  
17 U.S.C. § 111(f)(3) (2012).  
84 ivi, 691 F.3d at 280. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. (asserting that “the growth of ‘cloud-based systems,’ or virtual 
platforms where content resides remotely on a distant server, further 
highlights the uncertainty as to whether an Internet retransmission 
service is or utilizes a facility that receives and retransmits television 
signals”). 
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the court stated, “Congress’s intent is not apparent from the 
statutory text.”87 
The ivi court found the primary support for its ruling in 
the legislative history of the Copyright Act. In particular, the 
court viewed the addition of the satellite compulsory 
licensing scheme codified in Section 119 as evidence that 
Congress did not intend new technologies to be interpreted 
as qualifying as a cable system under Section 111.88 Further, 
the court gave weight to congressional history, stating that 
because compulsory licensing is a “derogation of the 
exclusive property rights granted by the Copyright Act to 
copyright holders,” Congress “needs to act as narrowly as 
possible to minimize the effects of the government’s intrusion 
on the broader market . . . .”89 Similarly, while “Congress 
expressly included ‘microwave’ as an acceptable 
communications channel for retransmissions,” it “has not 
codified a statutory provision for Internet retransmissions, 
nor has it included the ‘Internet’ as an acceptable 
communication channel under § 111.”90 This history 
demonstrated, according to the court, that Congress did not 
intend Section 111 to extend to Internet transmissions.91 In 
addition, the court accorded Chevron deference to the 
Copyright Office’s position that Internet retransmission 
services are not cable systems under Section 111.92 
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York discussed the ivi decision in Aereo IV, after the U.S. 
Supreme Court remanded the case.93 The ivi decision became 
relevant at that stage because the defendant attempted to 
shift its stance from arguing that it was not required to pay 
 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 281. 
89 Id. at 281–82 (quoting S. REP. NO. 106-42, at 10 (1999)). 
90 Id. at 282 & n.8 (noting references to “contiguous communities” in 
17 U.S.C. § 111). 
91 Id. at 282–83. 
92 Id. at 283–84. 
93 Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo IV), No. 12-CV-1540, 2014 WL 
5393867 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014). 
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copyright holders anything at all to arguing that it was 
entitled to a compulsory license under Section 111.94 Aereo 
argued that the language of the Supreme Court’s decision 
comparing its service to a cable system called into question 
the holding of ivi and necessitated a conclusion that it was 
entitled to a license under Section 111.95 The District Court 
disagreed, stating that “while all cable systems may perform 
publicly, not all entities that perform publicly are necessarily 
cable systems, and nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion 
indicates otherwise.”96 Ultimately, the District Court 
concluded that Aereo’s new tactic amounted to little more 
than a desperate attempt to “turn lemons into lemonade” 
after its loss at the Supreme Court.97 
The Second Circuit’s reasoning was adopted by the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia in Fox v. FilmOn 
X, a case involving the same litigants as Fox v. AereoKiller, 
discussed in Part III.C. As in AereoKiller and Aereo IV, the 
defendant argued for a “technology-agnostic” approach, 
drawing on language in the Supreme Court’s Aereo III 
decision.98 In rejecting this argument, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia noted that the Supreme Court’s 
Aereo III analysis was limited to the Transmit Clause and 
that therefore “any analogy to cable companies should be 
interpreted in that particular context.”99 The FilmOn court 
ultimately came to the same conclusion as the Second 
Circuit, deciding that “the plain language of § 111(f)(3) 
 
94 Id. at *1–2. 
95 Id. at *3 (“Aereo now seeks to capitalize on the Supreme Court's 
comparison of it to a CATV system to argue that it is in fact a cable system 
that should be entitled to a compulsory license under § 111.”). 
96 Id. at *4. 
97 Id. at *3. 
98 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, No. 13-758 (RMC), 
2015 WL 7761052, at *10 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2015) (citing Aereo III) (“To 
support this proposition, Defendants rely on the fact that the Supreme 
Court highlighted the ‘overwhelming likeness’ between Aereo’s service and 
that of CATV systems and dismissed technological differences on the basis 
that they were ‘invisible to subscriber and broadcaster alike.’”). 
99 Id. at *10. 
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contradicts Defendants’ position that Internet-based 
retransmitters are entitled to a compulsory license,” and 
deferring to the Copyright Office’s view that FilmOn X is not 
a cable system under Section 111.100 
D. The Copyright Office Rebuffed: Fox v. AereoKiller 
The U.S. District Court for the Central District of 
California faced the same question in Fox v. AereoKiller but 
reached the opposite conclusion, finding that Internet 
retransmission services are “cable systems” under Section 
111 and therefore are entitled to compulsory licensing.101 The 
procedural posture of the case was similar to that of Aereo 
IV—FilmOn X had previously raised a defense based on the 
same public performance theory that was rejected by the 
Supreme Court in Aereo III and switched to a Section 111 
theory in AereoKiller.102 More importantly, the technology 
 
100 Id. at *16 (“The Court’s interpretation becomes even more forceful 
when the text is read as part of the overall statutory scheme.”). Notably, 
the FilmOn court applied a different level of deference to the Copyright 
Office’s interpretation of Section 111. This difference ultimately did not 
have an effect on the outcome, because the FilmOn court, like the Aereo IV 
court, ultimately concluded that deference to the Copyright Office position 
is appropriate. See id. at *21. 
101 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. AereoKiller, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 
1154 (C.D. Cal. 2015). The defendant company has since changed its name 
from “AereoKiller” to “FilmOn X.” Thus, to avoid confusion, the company 
will be referred to in this Note as “FilmOn X” while the case will be 
referred to as “AereoKiller.” Bryan Koenig, Streaming Co. Says It’s 
Entitled to Compulsory Cable License, LAW360 (June 19, 2015, 7:50 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/670236/streaming-co-says-it-s-entitled-to-
compulsory-cable-license [https://perma.cc/7FXV-NQJ4]. 
102 See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., 
PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1140–41 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (noting that the 
defendants argued that their service was “technologically analogous to the 
service which the Southern District of New York found to be non-
infringing in” Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo I), 874 F. Supp. 2d 373 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012)); see also AereoKiller, 115 F. Supp. 3d, at 1154–56 
(discussing the procedural background of the case). 
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utilized by FilmOn X was substantially similar to the 
technology at issue in Aereo III.103 
After tracing the history of Section 111 from the 
Fortnightly and Teleprompter decisions through to the 
addition of similar provisions aimed at satellite services,104 
the court considered the ivi court’s approach and the 
Copyright Office’s approach.105 The court disagreed with the 
ivi court’s reasoning, holding that “17 U.S.C. § 111(f)(3) 
simply does not draw the distinction” between traditional 
cable and Internet retransmission services.106 Because it 
found no ambiguity in the language of the statute, the court 
found it “unnecessary to turn to the legislative history or the 
administrative interpretation.”107 It is also worth noting that 
the AereoKiller court—unlike the Aereo IV court—found the 
language in the Supreme Court’s Aereo decision to be 
relevant, since that language seems to necessitate the 
conclusion that Internet-based transmission services are 
included in Section 111’s definition of “cable systems.”108 
IV. RECOMMENDATION 
Future courts that are faced with the question of whether 
an Internet retransmission service qualifies as a cable 
company under Section 111 of the Copyright Act should 
follow the AereoKiller court and give those services access to 
the cable compulsory license.109 The plain text of Section 111, 
 
103 AereoKiller, 115 F. Supp. 3d, at 1156–58 (describing FilmOn X’s 
system, which, like Aereo’s, utilized miniature antennae to allow users to 
access over-the-air content). 
104 Id. at 1159–62. 
105 Id. at 1163–69. 
106 Id. at 1168. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 1163 (noting that although the Aereo III decision was not 
controlling because it did not address the Section 111 question, it is “about 
as close a statement directly in Defendants’ favor as could be made”). 
109 The AereoKiller court did not explicitly discuss the Skidmore 
standard of deference as noted in Part III.A, supra, and instead rested its 
decision on the plain meaning of the statute. However, it should be noted 
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the legislative history of the Act, and the Supreme Court’s 
Aereo III decision all point towards compulsory license 
eligibility for Internet retransmission services. Moreover, 
this position would accomplish the significant policy goal of 
increasing competition in the marketplace and would 
represent a method of interpretation that best promotes the 
purposes of the Copyright Act. 
A.  Comparing and Contrasting the ivi Position and the 
AereoKiller Position  
The crux of the disagreement between the Second Circuit 
in ivi and the U.S. District Court for the Central District of 
California in AereoKiller is the plain language of the 
statute.110 To the Second Circuit, there is substantial 
ambiguity in Section 111, which required it to conduct part 
two of its Chevron analysis to reach the ultimate result of 
deference to the Copyright Office. In contrast, the 
AereoKiller court found that the statute leaves ample room 
for the operation of Internet retransmission services.111 
Notably, it is strange that the ivi court characterized the 
Internet writ large as the possible facility that would place 
these services under the Section 111 definition of “cable 
system.” While there is little doubt that the Internet itself is 
not a “facility” under Section 111, it is certainly possible that 
the definition is met by individual servers, web addresses 
and so on. Indeed, under other U.S. law, the Internet is 
defined as: “collectively the myriad of computer and 
telecommunications facilities, including equipment and 
 
that in addition to the plain meaning of the text, the legislative history 
and the overarching goals of Section 111 provide additional support for 
rejecting the Copyright Office’s position. 
110 For the purposes of this comparison, this Part considers the “ivi 
position” to include the D.C. District Court’s opinion in Fox Television 
Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, No. 13-758 (RMC), 2015 WL 7761052 
(D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2015). 
111 AereoKiller, 115 F. Supp. 3d, at 1167 (“[I]t is difficult to recognize 
the ambiguity the Second Circuit saw in the statute, at least as applied to 
the facts of this case.”). 
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operating software, which comprise the interconnected 
world-wide network of networks that employ the 
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol, or any 
predecessor successor protocols to such protocol, to 
communicate information of all kinds by wire or radio.”112 
This definition suggests that the Internet should be viewed 
as a network of various facilities. As the AereoKiller court 
observed, although the Second Circuit was correct insofar as 
“[t]he ‘Internet’ . . . can’t be a ‘facility’ for purposes of the 
§ 111 analysis because without Defendants’ facilities, the 
Internet does not receive Plaintiffs’ public broadcast signal,” 
its analysis is flawed because the Internet “is not the ‘facility’ 
urged by Defendants here.”113 In short, the ivi court’s 
analysis of the “facilities” question was simply inapposite. 
The FilmOn court—citing ivi for support—argued that 
the “facility” requirement is not met by Internet 
retransmission services because “§ 111(f)(3) requires that a 
physical ‘facility’ must receive the broadcast signals and 
make the secondary transmissions to paying subscribers,” 
and therefore “any system that fails to encompass the 
distribution medium and does not retransmit the signals 
directly to the subscriber does not qualify as a ‘cable 
system.’”114 Because Internet retransmission services 
necessarily must first transmit the signal to an Internet 
service provider (“ISP”), the court argued, a subscriber 
“receives the retransmission, not from the ‘facility,’ but from 
interconnected computers through cyberspace.”115 The court 
cited references to “headends” in Section 111(f)(3) to support 
this emphasis on complete control over the distribution 
medium.116 
 
112 15 U.S.C. § 6555 (2012) (emphasis added). 
113 AereoKiller, 115 F. Supp. 3d, at 1167. 
114 FilmOn, 2015 WL 7761052, at *13. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. This reading may be the result of discomfort with the 
differences between the Section 111(f)(3) definition of “cable systems” and 
the definition contained in the Communications Act. Compare 17 U.S.C. 
§ 111(f)(3) (2012), with 47 U.S.C. § 522(7) (2012) (“[T]he term ‘cable 
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The textual support for this argument isn’t particularly 
strong—as the AereoKiller court noted, the sentence in 
Section 111(f)(3) that references headends “merely provides 
how commonly-owned cable systems should be treated for 
purposes of royalty computation and does not impose 
additional requirements onto the definition of ‘cable 
system.’”117 It is most naturally read as an exception that 
helps to clarify the definition contained in the first sentence. 
Since the Internet retransmission services at issue are not 
covered by the second sentence, there is no reason to treat 
the “headends” language as removing such services from the 
Section 111 definition of “cable systems.” Perhaps more 
pointedly, even assuming that the language in the second 
sentence should have some bearing on the definition 
contained in the first sentence,118 “[n]othing about the usage 
of ‘headend’ in the statute indicates that [Internet 
retransmission services do] not employ one.”119 Moreover, the 
statute explicitly names “microwave” as an acceptable means 
of making secondary transmissions.120 Since microwave 
signals are transmitted over the air, a cable system cannot 
be said to “encompass the distribution medium” through 
which those signals are transmitted. It is therefore difficult 
 
system’ means a facility, consisting of a set of closed transmission paths 
and associated signal generation, reception, and control equipment that is 
designed to provide cable service . . . . ”) (emphasis added). However, the 
Copyright Office does not argue that the definitions are coextensive. See 
SHVERA REPORT, supra note 65, at 199 (finding that Internet-Protocol 
(“IP”) based services are eligible for the Section 111 license, despite those 
services failing to meet the statutory definition of cable system under the 
Communications Act). 
117 FilmOn, 2015 WL 7761052, at *12 n.16; see also AereoKiller, 115 
F. Supp. 3d at 1168 (“The second sentence [of Section 111(f)(3)] merely 
provides that certain commonly owned cable systems will be treated as a 
single system for purposes of computing a royalty.”). 
118 FilmOn, 2015 WL 7761052 at *12 n.16 (“This does not mean that 
this sentence should be ignored when deciding what qualifies as a cable 
system.”). 
119 AereoKiller, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1168. 
120 17 U.S.C. § 111(f)(3) (2012). 
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to read the statute as demanding complete control over the 
distribution medium. 
The ivi court’s arguments relying upon the legislative 
history are no more convincing. First, although Congress did 
add a separate compulsory licensing scheme for satellite 
systems under Section 119, the court’s account of that 
section’s legislative history is incomplete. When that section 
was first added to the Copyright Act as part of the Satellite 
Home Viewer Act of 1988, Congress noted that one of the 
factors that prompted the introduction of a separate 
statutory scheme for satellite were “concerns about 
scrambling”—the process by which satellite carriers made 
their signals inaccessible except to those for whom the signal 
was intended.121 Specifically, satellite carriers were worried 
that “[b]y scrambling their signals . . . they may lose their 
‘passive carrier’ exemption from liability for copyright 
infringement under section 111(a)(3) of the Copyright Act.”122 
Notably, Congress explicitly “express[ed] no view about the 
merits of the positions advanced by [entities asserting that 
they might qualify as a ‘cable system’ under section 111 in 
then-undecided cases].”123 This suggests that Section 119 
should not be read to preclude Internet streaming services 
from access to a Section 111 license. 
The ivi court’s mistreatment of this issue may be the 
result of confusion. The opinion references an Eleventh 
Circuit case decided in 1991, Satellite Broad Networks 
(“SBN”), which held that satellite carriers are “cable 
systems” under Section 111.124 The ivi court asserts that this 
decision prompted a congressional response in 1998 of 
“codifying a separate statutory license for satellite carriers 
under § 119 of the Copyright Act.”125 But as noted above and 
 
121 H.R. REP. NO. 100-887, pt. 1, at 12 (1988). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 14. 
124 WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 281 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing 
Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Satellite Broad. Networks, Inc., 940 F.2d 1467, 1471 
(11th Cir. 1991)). 
125 Id. 
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in the court’s own opinion, Section 119 was added in 1988 in 
the Satellite Home Viewer Act.126 Equally strange is the 
court’s claim that the Eleventh Circuit decision was 
superseded by Section 119, as recognized in a later decision, 
Satellite Broadcasting & Communications Ass’n of America 
v. Oman.127 Oman reversed SBN based on deference to the 
Copyright Office, not based on Section 119.128 
It seems likely that the ivi court had instead intended to 
reference the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Georgia decision that was on appeal in SBN, decided in 
1988.129 Indeed, as the AereoKiller court noted, it was this 
decision that prompted congressional action.130 This 
distinction is immensely important; although the Eleventh 
Circuit eventually decided that a satellite system should be 
considered a Section 111 “cable system,” that decision 
overturned the District Court’s opposite holding. This 
fundamentally undermines the ivi court’s argument on this 
point—congressional action was incited not by a perceived 
need to distinguish satellite from cable, but from a worry 
 
126 Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 
3949 (1988). 
127 ivi, 691 F.3d at 281. See generally Satellite Broad. & Commc’ns 
Ass’n of Am. v. Oman, 17 F.3d 344 (11th Cir. 1994). 
128 Oman, 17 F.3d at 346, 348. In fact, in footnote 2 of the Oman 
opinion, the court noted that “Section 119 . . . offers little guidance in 
interpreting § 111 because the accompanying House Report stated: 
[N]othing in this Act is intended to reflect any view as to 
the proper interpretation of section 111 of this title prior to 
enactment of this Act, or after this Act ceases to be 
effective . . . . In particular, nothing in this Act is intended 
to reflect any view concerning whether . . . an entity that 
retransmits television broadcast signals by satellite to 
private homes could qualify as a “cable system” under 
section 111(f). 
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-887, pt. 1, at 27 (1988)).  
129 See Pac. & S. Co. v. Satellite Broad. Networks, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 
1565, 1570, 1572, 1575 (N.D. Ga. 1988). 
130 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. AereoKiller, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 
1161 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 
MAKAR – FINAL 
504 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2016 
 
that the courts would not interpret Section 111(f) to include 
satellite. In order to ensure that satellite would be afforded 
the same protection, Congress created a new statutory 
exemption. Although, as the FilmOn court notes, “[i]nstead 
of amending the definition of a cable system, Congress 
enacted the Satellite Home Viewer Act in 1988 [which 
created Section 119],” the purpose of this action was to offer 
protections to satellite that would place it on even footing 
with cable; it was not intended to affect the Section 111 
definition of a cable system.131 Such a reading runs directly 
counter to congressional direction that “nothing in [the 
Satellite Home Viewer Act] is intended to reflect any view 
concerning whether . . . an entity that retransmits television 
broadcast signals by satellite to private homes could qualify 
as a ‘cable system’ under section 111(f).”132 This history 
hardly can be considered evidence that Section 119 should be 
interpreted to prevent Internet retransmission services from 
having access to Section 111. 
Moreover, although the ivi court suggests that the sole 
purpose of the Section 111 license is to “address issues of 
reception and remote access to over-the-air television 
signals,”133 Congress has also expressed that the compulsory 
licensing scheme is aimed at the “promotion of competition 
in the marketplace for delivery of multichannel video 
programming” which “is an effective policy to reduce costs to 
consumers.”134 Clearly placing Internet retransmission 
services on an even footing with cable and satellite would 
inject competition into the marketplace and encourage the 
development of new services to the benefit of consumers.135 
 
131 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, No. 13-758 (RMC), 
2015 WL 7761052, at *13 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2015). 
132 H.R. REP. NO. 100-887 pt. 1, at 27 (1988). 
133 WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 282 (2d Cir. 2012). 
134 S. REP. NO. 106-42, at 10 (1999). 
135 This has been recognized by the FCC in considering a policy of 
including Internet retransmission services in its definition of MVPDs. See 
Promoting Innovation and Competition in the Provision of Multichannel 
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A final point of contention between the two positions is 
the correct way to interpret Congress’ addition of 
“microwave” to Section 111(f)’s list of acceptable 
communications channels. The Second Circuit found this to 
be evidence that Internet transmissions are not covered by 
Section 111, since Congress did not also expressly add 
Internet transmissions.136 The AereoKiller court disagreed, 
pointing out that despite its discussion of the addition of 
“microwave,” the Court “did not purport to find any 
ambiguity in the phrase ‘or other communications 
channels’ . . . .”137 The legislative history of this addition was 
not discussed by the ivi court, and the AereoKiller court 
noted that in fact, the addition was an acknowledgement of 
prior court rulings recognizing microwave transmissions as 
falling under Section 111(f).138 In addition, it is telling that 
Section 111(f) was revised “because of an unnecessarily 
restrictive interpretation by the Copyright Office of the 
phrase ‘or other communications channels’ in the same 
definition.”139 Rather than a truly substantive revision, 
Congress viewed the addition of “microwave” as “a 
clarification of existing law.”140 
As the AereoKiller court effectively argues, “it is difficult 
to recognize the ambiguity the Second Circuit saw in the 
statute.”141 The FilmOn X system seems to clearly utilize a 
facility that receives and transmits signals to subscribing 
members of the public through “wires, cables, microwave, or 
other communications channels.”142 Neither the Second 
 
Video Programming Distribution Services, 80 Fed. Reg. 2078 (proposed 
Jan. 15, 2015) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76). 
136 ivi, 691 F.3d at 282. 
137 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. AereoKiller, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 
1167 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 
138 See Hubbard Broad., Inc. v. S. Satellite Sys., Inc., 777 F.2d 393, 
401 (8th Cir. 1985); see also AereoKiller, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1162 n.11. 
139 H.R. REP. NO. 103-703, at 17 (1994). 
140 Id. 
141 AereoKiller, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1167. 
142 17 U.S.C. § 111(f)(3) (2012). 
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Circuit’s textual analysis of the meaning of “facilities” nor its 
consideration of the legislative history is particularly 
convincing. More broadly, the ivi decision, as well as its 
subsequent application in Aereo IV, seems to employ logic 
that runs directly counter to the Supreme Court’s Aereo III 
decision. The Supreme Court explicitly relied upon the 
comparison between Aereo’s service and a traditional cable 
company in finding that Aereo was publically performing. 
Meanwhile, the ivi court’s reasoning, deferring to the views 
of the Copyright Office, would “contest this rationale, 
arguing that the technological differences between a cable 
company and Defendants’ Internet rebroadcasting system 
are exceedingly meaningful to the broadcaster.”143 Although 
the FilmOn court attempted to address this point by 
confining the Aereo III approach to the Transmit Clause,144 it 
is both counterintuitive and awkward to say that Internet 
retransmission services are the same as cable companies for 
the purposes of the Transmit Clause, but are distinct from 
cable companies for the purposes of Section 111. 
Given that the plain text of the statute, the legislative 
history, and the language of the Aereo III decision all support 
the inclusion of Internet retransmission services under the 
definition of “cable systems” in Section 111, the AereoKiller 
position is persuasive. 
B. Inclusion of Internet Transmissions Will 
Accomplish the Goal of Increasing Competition in 
the Marketplace 
The above analysis makes clear that the statutory 
language is broad enough to encompass Internet 
retransmission services. Moreover, there are strong economic 
 
143 AereoKiller, 115 F. Supp. 3d, at 1163. 
144 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, No. 13-758 (RMC), 
2015 WL 7761052, at *10 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2015) (stating that Aereo III 
reflected the fact that “technological differences could be disregarded when 
interpreting the Transmit Clause, but not necessarily when analyzing a 
different provision of the Copyright Act”). 
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reasons for such an interpretation. As discussed above, one 
of the aims of the compulsory licensing schemes included in 
the Copyright Act is the “promotion of competition” in order 
to “reduce costs to consumers.”145 This goal is only realized to 
a limited extent in the current copyright regime because 
traditional cable companies enjoy local monopolies. The 
introduction of satellite television was an unequivocal 
success in this respect, resulting in billions of dollars in 
consumer gains.146 Internet-based services would 
undoubtedly provide a similar benefit to consumers. 
Furthermore, interpreting Section 111 to allow 
compulsory licensing would force cable companies to compete 
more broadly. In the current television landscape, cable 
companies often do not compete directly because individual 
companies are dominant in certain regions.147 Making the 
Section 111 license available to Internet services could force 
traditional cable companies to begin offering their own 
version of online broadcasts and thereby compete against 
each other nationally. Even without this change in how 
Section 111 is applied, cable companies have faced some 
pressure to compete with online content providers.148 
Nevertheless, traditional cable continues to enjoy a 
substantial competitive advantage over these services in that 
it can offer live programming; certain events such as sports 
contests or awards shows decline precipitously in value the 
 
145 S. REP. NO. 106-42, at 10 (1999). 
146 See generally Austan Goolsbee & Amil Petrin, The Consumer 
Gains from Direct Broadcast Satellites and the Competition with Cable TV, 
72 ECONOMETRICA 351 (2004) (arguing that the introduction of satellite 
resulted in aggregate gains of $2.5 billion for satellite subscribers and $3 
billion for cable subscribers). 
147 See Note, Enabling Television Competition in a Converged Market, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 2083, 2090–92 (2013) (discussing the phenomenon of 
“clustering” in television markets). 
148 Alex Sherman, Why the Cable Companies You Hate May be Forced 
to Compete Online, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 1, 2015, 1:44 PM), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-01/why-the-cable-companies-you-
hate-may-be-forced-to-compete-online [https://perma.cc/Q5Y6-WURW]. 
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more they are “time shifted.”149 As a result, these services 
cannot be said to be true competitors of traditional cable. 
Giving Internet retransmission services access to the Section 
111 license would eliminate this advantage by placing 
Internet retransmission services on even footing with cable 
providers.150 If traditional cable and Internet retransmission 
services had equal access to the Section 111 compulsory 
license, consumers would be presented with a legitimate 
alternative to cable and satellite that includes the ability to 
view live programming broadcast over-the-air. 
Finally, providing access to Section 111 could be the first 
step on a path of disintermediation of the delivery of video 
content. As others have noted, online delivery of content may 
ultimately pressure content providers themselves to make 
content available online.151 Indeed this type of behavior is 
already beginning to take place, as many networks have 
responded to the threat of services such as Hulu and Netflix 
 
149 The issue of competition is certainly complicated by the fact that 
many traditional cable companies also control Internet access. See Robert 
B. Reich, The Rigging of the American Market, BALTIMORE SUN (Nov. 4, 
2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/bal-the-rigg 
ing-of-the-american-market-20151103-story.html [http://perma.cc/7QPB-
5ATK] (noting that eighty percent of Americans have no choice in Internet 
service provider). However, that discussion is beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
150 Of course, this advantage will not disappear immediately, 
especially given that, during the Aereo litigation, major sports leagues 
asserted that they would move all games to cable if the service was 
deemed legal. NFL, MLB Back Broadcasters in Fight vs Aereo, CNBC 
(Nov. 18, 2013, 3:57 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2013/11/18/nfl-mlb-back-
broadcasters-in-fight-vs-aereo.html [http://perma.cc/4AK4-X8NE]. Such a 
strategy does not seem as though it would be sustainable given that the 
preeminent cable sports channel, ESPN, is facing reduced revenues as a 
result of declining cable subscriptions. Matt Bonesteel, Survey Paints 
Gloomy Picture for ESPN, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 14, 2016, 11:01 AM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/breaking/ct-espn-disney-cable-tv-
20160114-story.html [https://perma.cc/7CPP-BRGE]. 
151 See Bradley Ryba, Comment, Aerevolution: Why We Should, 
Briefly, Embrace Unlicensed Online Streaming of Retransmitted Broadcast 
Television Content, 13 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 577, 595 (2014) 
(describing this as “[t]he networks' most sensible solution”). 
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by making certain content available online after airing.152 
Though it is difficult to foresee how the online marketplace 
for content will evolve, it is possible that users will 
ultimately be able to shop for the shows that they are most 
interested in and to build a personal bundle of programming. 
Allowing consumers to choose programming in this way 
would allow for a more efficient allocation of resources and 
would add to the substantial economic benefits realizable 
through increased competition in the marketplace. 
C. The Copyright Act Should Be Interpreted Flexibly 
to Allow for Changing Technology 
As the Aereo IV, AereoKiller, and FilmOn courts 
indicated, these cases directly confront whether the 
Copyright Act should be “technology-agnostic,” and thus they 
provide an opportunity to examine how the Copyright Act 
should apply moving forward.153 Copyright is “a creature of 
technology.”154 Therefore, the Act should be interpreted 
flexibly to allow for technological change, especially in a 
period of such rapid innovation. The application of the ivi 
rationale in cases such as Aereo IV and AereoKiller would 
lead to a copyright regime that does little to balance private 
property rights with the public benefit of access to 
copyrighted works, and that instead “hardwires a lack of 
balance between rights and exceptions—giving a broad, 
 
152 David Pogue, Networks Start to Offer TV on the Web, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 18, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/18/technology/circuits/18 
pogue.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
153 See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, No. 13-758 
(RMC), 2015 WL 7761052, at *10 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2015) (“The Court does 
not agree that the Supreme Court adopted a technology-agnostic 
interpretation of the Transmit Clause, let alone the Copyright Act as a 
whole.”); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. AereoKiller, 115 F. Supp. 3d 
1152, 1163 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (“[C]ourts consistently reject the argument 
that technological changes affect the balance of rights as between 
broadcasters and retransmitters in the wake of technological innovation.”). 
154 Brad Sherman & Leanne Wiseman, Copyright: When Old 
Technologies Were New, in COPYRIGHT AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE NEW 1 
(Brad Sherman & Leanne Wiseman eds., 2012). 
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technology-neutral scope to the former and a narrow, 
technology-specific scope to the latter.”155 Such an imbalance 
would stunt innovation and harm consumers.156 
Moreover, given the pace of technological change, a 
technology-agnostic approach would have significant 
practical advantages. As the defendants argued in 
AereoKiller, “it would be improper and unwise to force 
Congress to amend the Act every time a new broadcast 
retransmission technology was adopted by Section 111 
retransmitters.”157 This point is especially salient in light of 
the broad language of Section 111 and the legislative history 
of the Act, discussed more fully in Part IV.A supra. Courts 
should therefore follow the AereoKiller court’s lead and 
“reject the argument that technological changes affect the 
balance of rights as between broadcasters and retransmitters 
in the wake of technological innovation.”158 Holding 
otherwise “‘would largely freeze for section 111 purposes 
both technological development and implementation,’ and 
‘force both primary and secondary transmitters alike to 
forego available, economically feasible technology.’”159 
Adopting a technology-agnostic interpretation would ensure 
efficient operation of the statute and avoid these sorts of 
market distortions. 
 
155 Bridy, supra note 65, at 473–74. 
156 Geoffrey Palachuk, Aereo: Bringing the NFL to a “Cloud” Near 
You: How Evolving Technology Demands Rapid Reevaluation of 
Legislative Protections in Light of Streaming Television Broadcasts, 50 
GONZ. L. REV. 117, 142 (2015) (asking “why protect the Broadcasters over 
the innovators?”). 
157 Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Summary Adjudication of Defendants’ Counterclaim for Declaratory Relief 
and Defendants’ Section 111 Affirmative Defense at 14, Fox Television 
Stations, Inc. v. AereoKiller, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 
CV 12–6921–GW (JCx)). 
158 AereoKiller, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1163 (arguing that courts have 
consistently taken this stance). 
159 AereoKiller, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1171 (quoting Hubbard Broad., Inc. 
v. S. Satellite Sys., Inc., 777 F.2d 393, 400 (8th Cir. 1985)). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This Note argues that Internet retransmission services 
easily fit the statutory definition of “cable system” and 
should have access to the cable compulsory license. The plain 
language of Section 111, its legislative history, and the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in the Aereo III decision all point 
towards a conclusion that the AereoKiller court was correct, 
and the ivi case was wrongly decided. Moreover, there are 
strong policy reasons weighing in favor of placing Internet 
retransmission services on even footing with cable and 
satellite. The Copyright Act should not be a static piece of 
legislation that is unresponsive to the changing realities of 
how content is delivered. The exact means of delivery should 
not have an effect on the operation of Section 111 so long as 
it is substantially similar to the very systems the Section 
was written to cover. Reading Section 111 to cover Internet 
retransmission services helps to advance the goals of 
copyright by more effectively balancing the rights of 
copyright owners with benefits for consumers. 
